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The ethnic ‘other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the case of 
Russia and the Russians 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines portrayals of Russia and the Russians in two generations of 
Ukrainian history textbooks. It observes that the textbooks are highly condemning of 
Ukraine‟s main ethnic other in the guise of foreign ruler: the tsarist authorities and the 
Soviet regime are always attributed dubious and malicious intentions even if there is 
appreciation for some of their policies. By contrast, the books, certainly those of the 
second generation, refrain from presenting highly biased accounts of the ethnic other as a 
national group (i.e. Russians). Instances where negative judgements do fall onto Russians 
are counterbalanced by excerpts criticizing ethnic Ukrainians or highlighting conflicting 
interests within the Ukrainian ethnic group. The negative appraisal of the ethnic other as 
foreign ruler is clearly instrumental for the nation-building project as it sustains a 
discourse legitimating the existence of Ukraine as independent state. However, recent 
trends in history education, the paper concludes, suggest that the importance of nurturing 
patriotism as a national policy objective is diminishing. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
National consolidation is usually one of the top priorities of new states and education is 
often seen as the key agent in this process. By educating youngsters in the national 
language, history and culture, the political elites of these states hope to strengthen 
national unity and patriotism and abate internal divisions of an ethnic or social nature. 
Nation building policies like these have been well documented for both western and 
eastern states both now and in the past. Many studies have pointed to the problematic 
nature of these policies in multi-ethnic societies by noting that the promotion of one 
language and culture automatically leads to the demotion of another (e.g. Linz and Stepan 
1996; Kymlicka 2001). In this sense, as one observer has perceptively noted, nation 
building also entails „nation destroying‟ (Connor 1972). There is a wealth of literature, 
particularly in relation to the post-communist states, highlighting the tensions that arise 
between the ethnic majority on the one hand and one or several minorities on the other 
when the latter resist the cultural unification programme of the former (e.g. Brubaker 
1996; Kolstø 2000; Opalski 1998; Tishkov 1997). Most of this literature has focused on 
language issues, territorial autonomy, and the representation of minorities in state 
institutions. Academia has paid relatively little attention to the role of history education in 
the construction of national identity despite its obvious relevance for nation building 
politics. Through education in national history the state attempts to root national identity 
in the past and nurture youngsters in a historical narrative that legitimizes state 
independence and the cultural politics of the state. The few studies that have focused on 
history education as a nationalizing agent (e.g. Hein and Selden 2000; Koulouri 2001; 
Vickers 2005) have generally not linked their findings to theories and debates in the field 
of nationalism and ethnic conflicts. This study may be seen as an interdisciplinary effort 
to tackle this omission. It expands on some of my previous work in which I sought to 
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contribute to the ethnic-East / civic-West debate in the field of nationalism by analysing 
history textbooks (e.g. Janmaat 2006).   
 An important aspect of history education is the treatment of ethnic others. As 
Carras (2001) and Schissler (2001) have noted, states with nationalizing programs usually 
portray ethnic others in a negative light in their history textbooks. Harmful effects of 
contacts with ethnic others are highlighted whereas positive results are downplayed or 
omitted altogether. This negative stereotyping of ethnic others may be said to have four 
functions for identity construction. First, it sets boundaries and distinguishes the in- from 
the out-group. This boundary setting involves more than the simple ethnic labelling of 
persons and groups. By assigning certain vices to the out-group and certain virtues to the 
in-group, nation-builders can reinforce the uniqueness and depth of the in-group‟s 
identity and give its members the assured feeling of moral superiority. Second, by 
stressing the hostility of the out-group, it sweeps conflicts within the in-group under the 
carpet, which contributes to the latter‟s cohesion. Third, it provides a justification for a 
liberation struggle against a foreign “oppressor” and for the establishment and 
consolidation of an independent state. Finally, it acquits the governing elite of a newly 
independent state from bad management by holding the former foreign regime 
responsible for the current problems in society (i.e. the scapegoat mechanism).  
 It must be noted that the ethnic stereotyping in textbooks and in other media has 
regularly been high on the agenda of (nongovernmental) international organizations 
promoting peace, human rights and democracy, certainly during or shortly after major 
international conflicts. Thus, as early as the 1920s the League of Nations launched 
various initiatives to combat mutual xenophobia, proceeding from the assumption that the 
national prejudice in textbooks must have contributed to the aggressive nationalism and 
militarism of the warring parties in World War I. A strikingly similar reaction occurred 
after World War II. In cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Georg Eckert 
Institute for International Textbook Research, UNESCO organized conferences, bilateral 
projects and the development of guidelines for improving teaching materials and 
textbooks in an effort to foster international cooperation and understanding (Pingel 1999). 
In similar vein, the eruption of violent ethnic conflicts following the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe sparked a series of activities of various organizations, 
including the Council of Europe and Euroclio (the European Standing Conference of 
History Teachers Associations), which in essence were all aimed at countering prejudice 
and intolerance and stimulating civic values, critical thinking and democracy. Thus, with 
each new round of violent conflict, international concern about the role of history 
education in fostering inter-ethnic animosity is gathering momentum.   
 This paper examines representations of the ethnic other in Ukrainian history 
textbooks. Ukraine is an interesting case to study as it is both a new state emerging from 
the ashes of the Soviet Union and a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state, which means 
that the majority-minority problematic very much applies. Moreover, it is a state for 
which it is extremely easy to find a suitable ethnic other for the identity construction 
project: Russia and the Russians. From the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth 
century, much of what is present-day Ukraine has been ruled by Russia and its 
communist successor – the Soviet Union. This paper therefore focuses on portrayals of 
Russia and the Russians. The more prejudiced the books are towards this ethnic other, the 
more important the nationalizing agenda is considered to be in relation to other objectives 
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of history education. In this respect, it is worth noting that the cultivation of national 
identity is an official - and therefore weighty - policy objective, as numerous documents 
testify. For instance, the strategic national programme “Education – Ukraine of the 
twenty-first century”, adopted in 1993 by a nationalist government headed by Ukraine‟s 
first president Leonid Kravchuk, calls on education to espouse “a national orientation 
which proceeds from the indivisibility of education from national foundations, the 
organic unity with national history and folk traditions, and the preservation and 
enrichment of the culture of the Ukrainian people” (Government of Ukraine, 1994, p. 7). 
 
 
The ethnic other in history textbooks: differences between East and West? 
 
A factor that is likely to contribute to the negative stereotyping of the others in textbooks 
is a national narrative of victimization. As Koulouri (2001) and Kymlicka (2001) 
observed, there is a marked tendency among nations in the Balkans and in Eastern 
Europe to see themselves as victims of centuries of foreign oppression. Thus the Serbs 
and the Greeks hold grievances against the Turks, the Czechs against the Austrians and 
the Germans, the Slovaks and the Romanians against the Hungarians, and the Poles, the 
Ukrainians and the Baltic nations against the Russians. In multi-ethnic states where 
minorities constituted the former rulers or were seen as collaborators with the foreign 
regime by the majority, inter-ethnic relations have remained tense in the post-communist 
period. As a rule, the majority distrusts the minority and suspects that it will opt for 
secession as soon as an opportunity arises. In conditions of ethnic conflict negative 
images of the ethnic other seem almost inescapable. Indeed, Koren (2001) observes that 
Croatian history and geography textbooks tend to give unflattering accounts of Serbs and 
stress hostility and conflict rather than cooperation in their descriptions of Croatian-Serb 
relations.  
This discussion raises an interesting point: given the prevailing sense of historical 
injustice in Eastern Europe, is historiography in that region fundamentally different from 
that in Western Europe? Some scholars support this view. Hans Kohn (1944; 1994), for 
instance, saw nationalist historiography as a necessary companion of an ethnic intolerant 
nationalism. This type of nationalism looked to the past as a source of inspiration, 
perceiving the nation as a natural and eternal entity defined by common historical 
experience, culture and descent. It prevailed, in Kohn‟s view, in those regions of Europe 
where feudal relations predominated, i.e. in Central and Eastern Europe. He contrasted 
this with a civic liberal nationalism which “arose in an effort to build a nation in the 
political reality and the struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for 
the past” (Kohn 1994, p. 164). He saw civic nationalism as characteristic of societies with 
strong middle classes - America, Britain, France, The Netherlands and Switzerland.  
Echoing Kohn, Velychenko (1998) argues that “the poorer, authoritarian societies east of 
the Elbe” pay much more attention to the identity construction function of historiography 
than the “wealthier, pluralist and constitutional societies of Western Europe” because the 
national identities of the former rely to a much greater extent on historical myths and 
legends.  
Kohn‟s view has been criticised for failing to recognize that Western nations also 
have ethnic and historical roots (Smith 1986). It is not denied that there are differences 
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between nations in the strength of ethnic conceptions but these are seen as a matter of 
degree and not of absolute difference (Smith 1991). Kuzio (2002) has suggested that the 
mix of ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood in any given state has nothing to do 
with geography but is contingent on the age of that state and on the consolidation of 
democracy. Moreover, returning to historiography, it has been noted that historical 
writings in the West have not always been friendly on ethnic others as well. Marsden 
(2000) for instance notes that the glorification of war and the vilification of neighbouring 
states permeated the history and geography textbooks of Great Britain, France, United 
States and Germany from the 1880s to the 1940s, despite efforts of the League of Nations 
to curb rampant chauvinism in textbooks in the interwar period. Berghahn and Schissler 
(1987) observe that it took a world war and a sustained effort of UNESCO and the 
Council of Europe before western states began removing nationalist leanings and ethnic 
stereotypes from their educational materials. Thematically, history textbooks diversified, 
addressing socio-economic and cultural issues and paying more attention to European 
and international issues (for a description of this process in German and French history 
and civics textbooks, see Soysal, Bertilotti and Mannitz 2005). In terms of pedagogical 
objectives, they exchanged the infusion of values, identities and pre-digested, 
unquestioned knowledge for the promotion of critical thinking, causal understanding and 
independent analysis (Berghahn and Schissler 1987). Antoniou and Soysal (2005) remark 
that Greece and Turkey, recently, have also turned their backs on nationalistic content 
and stereotypical images of the other in the teaching of national history. 
Is history going to repeat itself for Eastern Europe? Can we, in other words, 
expect eastern states to start off with ethnocentric narratives in the immediate post-
communist era and gradually substitute them for more neutral accounts of the ethnic 
other as their institutions and democracies mature and they grow more self-confident? 
The assumption that Eastern Europe will simply copy the trends witnessed in the West 
overlooks the fact that the world is not the same as 70 years ago. Human rights, 
liberalism, democracy and recognition of cultural difference have become influential 
worldwide discourses in the post-colonial era (Soysal and Schissler 2005). At the same 
time, developments in communication technology have given ordinary citizens an 
unprecedented opportunity to familiarize themselves with information and points of view 
not appreciated by the state. As a result, the nation-building projects of new states have 
been challenged both from below, by independent well-informed citizens and national 
minorities, and from above, by international agencies that closely monitor these states‟ 
cultural policies. Is it at all possible in these conditions to pursue monolithic nationalizing 
projects that denigrate the ethnic other? Or are we all deceived by the rhetoric of 
globalization, and is a very thin layer of highly visible successful urbanites disguising the 
fact that the rest of the population in the newly independent states still think in traditional 
terms? Indeed there seems to be some evidence that long-established ethnocentric views 
are much more resilient than international organizations are willing to admit (who seem 
to have the image of citizens as well-informed, non-prejudiced, vocal and rational 
decision makers). Anderson (2005), for instance, observes that  a new history course, 
introduced by the Moldovan government in 2003 and supported by the Council of 
Europe, was met with suspicion and hostility by ethnic Romanian teachers and parents, 
who perceived it as a shrewd attempt by their government to re-Sovietize and de-
nationalize them.  
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Methodological approach and textbook selection 
 
In the light of all these observations, how are the Russians as Ukraine‟s main ethnic other 
presented in history textbooks? Is Ukraine, in Kohn‟s terminology, behaving like a 
typical “ethnic intolerant” state by attributing only bad intentions to the Russians? Do we 
see differences between generations of textbooks reflecting a change towards more 
balanced accounts of the ethnic other? 
I will explore these questions by analysing two generations of textbooks for the 
History of Ukraine course, which the government instituted after independence. The 
ethnic other can be conceived of as a foreign ruler (Russia and the Soviet Union) or as a 
national group (the Russians). I will examine textbook representations of both these 
manifestations. I have further identified three „positive‟ periods and three „negative‟ 
periods in history when Ukraine was ruled by a foreign power. The positive periods are 
characterized by peace, rising standards of living and an expansion of civic and cultural 
liberties. By contrast, war, famine, sharply declining standards of living and/or increased 
oppression feature in the negative periods. I identified the reign of Alexander II (1855-
1881), the Soviet 1920s, and Khrushchev‟s Thaw (1956-1965) as the positive periods and 
the rule of Catherine II (end of eighteenth century), the consolidation of Bolshevik power 
in Ukraine (1917-1921), and the collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s as the 
negative periods. 
To assess how the textbooks write about the ethnic other in these periods, I will 
employ the following criteria: 
1. Positive appraisals. Do the textbooks also offer positive judgements about the 
foreign ruler‟s policies, or about the actions of members of the other national 
group? Are these judgements immediately followed by qualifications? 
2. Intentions. Is the ethnic other described as motivated solely by malign intentions? 
3. Ethnic labelling. Is there explicit ethnic labelling of perpetrators and victims? Are 
Russians exclusively seen as perpetrators and Ukrainians only as victims?  
4. Normative language. Are negative appraisals of the ethnic other reinforced by 
strong normative language?  
 
I selected the following textbooks for the analysis: 
 
First generation
1
: 
 
Kul‟chytskyi, S. V., Y. Kurnosov, and M. V. Koval‟ (1994) Istoria Ukrainy:  Chastyna I. 
Kyiv: Osvita. 
Sarbei, V.H. (1996) Istoria Ukrainy: XIX - Nachalo XX Veka. Kyiv: Heneza.  
Serhienko, H.Y. and V.A. Smolyi. (1995) Istoria Ukrainy: S Drevneishikh Vremen do 
Kontsa XVIII Veka. Kyiv: Osvita.  
Turchenko, F.H. (1995) Noveishaia Istoria Ukrainy: Chast' Pervaia (1917-1945 Gody). 
Kyiv: Heneza. 
                                                 
1
 Except for Kul‟chytskyi et al. the titles of the first generation textbooks are given in a transcription from 
Russian. This is because I read the Russian translations. 
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Turchenko, F.H.; P.P. Panchenko and C.M. Tymchenko (1995) Noveishaia Istoria 
Ukrainy: Chast' Vtoraia (1945-1995 Gody). Kyiv: Heneza.  
 
Second generation: 
 
Kul‟chyts‟kyi, S.V. and Y.I. Shapoval (2003) Novitnia Istoria Ukrainy (1914-1939). 
Kyiv: Heneza. 
Shvyd‟ko, H.K.(2003) Istoria Ukrainy: XVI-XVIII Stolittia. Kyiv: Heneza. 
Turchenko, F.H. (2002) Novitnia Istoria Ukrainy: Chastyna Persha 1914-1939. Kyiv: 
Heneza. 
Turchenko, F.H. and V.M. Moroko (2004) Istoria Ukrainy: Kinets’ XVIII – Pochatok XX 
Stolittia. Kyiv: Heneza. 
Turchenko, F.H.; P.P. Panchenko and C.M. Tymchenko (2004) Novitnia Istoria Ukrainy: 
Chastyna Druha 1939-2001. Kyiv: Heneza. 
 
 
There is good reason to assume that these textbooks were and are widely used as they are 
all officially approved by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education.
2
 After independence, the 
Ministry chose to continue the centralized Soviet approach to history education by 
issuing detailed national curricula and by closely supervising the textbook adoption, 
production and dissemination process.
3
 It also copied the practice of carving history up in 
a world history and national history course, thus underlining the distinctiveness of 
Ukrainian nation- and statehood. Yet, from the onset the Ministry has been careful to 
involve other agencies in the textbook writing and adoption procedure. In cooperation 
with the National Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and 
private publishers and foundations, it organizes annual competitions for new textbooks. 
The awarded textbooks are first tried and tested in schools and – if necessary - revised 
before receiving the official stamp of approval. Schools are obliged to use the officially 
approved textbooks but are free to use any kind of additional materials. Moreover, the 
Ministry seeks to diversify the offer of textbooks by providing schools with a choice of at 
least two textbooks per grade (Krylach and Kul‟chyts‟kyi 1999). Thus, the Ministry 
seems committed to allowing some measure of pluralism in the teaching of national 
history in schools. 
 
 
Portrayals of the ethnic other in ‘negative’ periods 
 
The elimination of the semi-autonomous Cossack state by Tsarina Catherine II in 1775 is 
an important negative event in Ukrainian historiography. It not only signals the total 
subjugation to Russian Tsarist rule, but also the reinforcement of serfdom and a retreat of 
the Ukrainian language from public affairs. Indeed, Serhienko and Smolyi (1995) and 
Shwyd‟ko (2003), the two textbooks examined for this period, both present narratives 
resembling lamentations of injustices and oppression. The actions of the Russian 
government are seen as being solely motivated by a lust for power and a desire to extract 
                                                 
2
 For a list of approved textbooks, see Osvita Ukrainy, 2004, no. 60-61, p. 15. 
3
 For the first national curriculum of the History of Ukraine course, see  Ministry of Education (1996). 
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profit from Ukraine‟s thriving agricultural economy. On occasion using strong normative 
language, the books recount how the plight of the peasants and free Cossack farmers 
worsened under Catherine‟s rule by the imposition of taxes, the re-introduction of labour 
duties, and regulations tying peasants to the land. The implication of these extracts is 
clear: the attitude of the Russian government toward the Ukrainian peasantry was one of 
complete indifference at best and of open hostility at worst. Yet, although the peasantry is 
presented as the cornerstone of Ukrainian nationhood, class relations are not exclusively 
cast in ethnic terms with an „innocent‟ Ukrainian peasantry being exploited by „cruel‟ 
Russian or Polish nobility. To the contrary, Shwyd‟ko (2003) contends that Catherina II 
restricted the freedom of movement of the peasantry on request of some Ukrainian 
nobles. He also notes that the Ukrainian landed gentry appealed to the tsarina to be given 
the same rights as the Russian nobility, seeing their request fulfilled by the Decree on the 
Independence of the Nobility (Ibid. 266). It is interesting that Shwyd‟ko identifies the 
nobility as Ukrainian while its predecessor (Serhienko and Smolyi 1995) is silent about 
the ethnicity of the aristocracy. This could be a sign that the new generation of textbooks 
is less apprehensive about challenging the myth that everything was peace and amity 
within the ethnic Ukrainian community.  
The second period that could be qualified as particularly traumatic in Ukrainian 
history is the establishment of Bolshevik rule in the early 1920s. The books covering this 
period (Turchenko 1995, 2001; Kul‟chytskyi and Shapoval 2003) all meticulously 
discuss how the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution became involved in a fierce 
struggle with the Central Rada, a Ukrainian parliament created in March 1917, to win the 
hearts and minds of the Ukrainian population. Unsurprisingly, they present the latter as 
the only political body that legitimately represented the Ukrainian nation and argue that 
the Bolsheviks were essentially a foreign power that imposed its rule on Ukraine. 
Although the books concede that the Bolsheviks had significant support among the urban 
proletariat and the population in the Donbass, they claim that the vast majority of 
Ukrainians remained loyal to the Central Rada. To underline this, they note that the rival 
assembly in Kharkiv, established by the Bolsheviks in December 1917, attracted 
delegates of no more than one-third of the Ukrainian local councils and that it hosted very 
few representatives of the Ukrainian peasantry. Turchenko (1995, 2001) points out that 
the Bolsheviks quickly resorted to other means to establish power when they realized that 
the Ukrainians would not join them voluntarily. In strong language, he accuses the 
Bolsheviks of eliminating democracy, persecuting Ukrainian culture, terrorizing the 
population and pillaging cities and countryside, and argues that these tactics merely 
provoked more resistance: “The establishment of Bolshevik power in Ukraine, by means 
of deceit, violence and direct interference from abroad, inevitably had to become and 
became the object of nationwide opposition” (Turchenko 1995, p. 58; 2001, p. 97). 
 Kul‟chits‟kyi and Shapoval (2003), on the other hand, refrain from using 
emotionally charged terminology and present a more cautious account of the Bolshevik 
takeover. They note, for instance, that the popularity of the Bolsheviks rose steeply after 
they exchanged their initial principles regarding the continuation of the war and the 
collectivization of agriculture for slogans which called for an immediate end to the war 
and an unconditional handover of land to the peasants. But the authors also underline the 
undemocratic nature of Bolshevism and claim that Lenin‟s followers only adopted 
populist slogans to increase their chances of organizing a successful coup d‟etat. 
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Moreover, the Bolsheviks are said to have stooped to terror after their capture of Kyiv in 
February 1918, instigating a massacre “the Ukrainian capital had not seen since the raids 
of Khan Batia [following the collapse of Kyivan Rus‟ in the thirteenth century, JGJ]” 
(Ibid. 69). 
 Despite their differences, neither Turchenko nor Kul‟chits‟kyi and Shapoval 
engage in ethnic boundary making. The Bolsheviks are not presented as a uniquely 
Russian movement as it is conceded that workers and the poorer sections of the Ukrainian 
peasantry were allured by their message. Nonetheless, Turchenko (1995, p. 180, 181; 
2001, pp. 224, 225) underlines the foreign origin of the Bolsheviks by stating that 
Ukrainians made up less than a quarter of the members of the Communist Party of 
Ukraine in the early 1920s and that many top ranking officials frowned upon the 
Ukrainian language, seeing it as a symbol of a backward, petty bourgeois peasant culture. 
 Undoubtedly the third negative period examined here, the collectivization of 
agriculture and its dramatic consequence, the 1932-33 Famine, is the most traumatic 
episode in Ukrainian history. Understandably, the textbooks are highly critical of the role 
of the Soviet regime in these events, attributing sole responsibility to Stalin‟s government 
for the occurrence of the disaster (see also Janmaat 2006). Both Turchenko (1995, 2002) 
and Kul‟chyts‟kyi et al (1994; 2003) note that Stalin‟s principal reason for pursuing the 
collectivization of agriculture was an easy extraction of and control over resources from 
the countryside. They also agree that the famine was artificial, being caused by food 
confiscation campaigns rather than natural events, and that it was a deliberate instrument 
of the authorities to crush the opposition of the Ukrainian peasantry to the collectivization 
drive.  
 Yet, as was the case in the narrative about the Bolsheviks, there are conspicuous 
differences between the authors. Turchenko‟s text is more radical in tone using strong 
normative language to discredit Stalin‟s regime. We read, for example, about the „cruel 
crimes‟ of Stalinism, about „cruel aggressors‟, the „monstrous‟ scale of the Famine in 
Ukraine, victims of the „genocide‟ of 1932-33, and about a totalitarian regime 
„terrorizing‟ the countryside (Turchenko 1995, pp. 225-228). Kul‟chytskyi et al (1994; 
2003) are also highly critical of Stalin‟s rule but use more neutral terminology. A second 
difference concerns the identification of the victims. Whereas Kul‟chyts‟kyi et al (1994, 
p. 194) contend that the agricultural policies were primarily targeting the peasantry – „In 
reality however these activities were consciously geared towards the slow physical 
annihilation of peasant families‟ - Turchenko argues that the whole Ukrainian nation 
suffered from these policies. Thus he opens his account of the Famine with the following 
statement: „One of the most cruel crimes committed by Stalinism against the Ukrainian 
nation was the Famine of 1932-1933‟ (Turchenko 1995, p. 225; 2002, p. 279). In the 
concluding paragraph he writes: 
 
The Tragedy of 1932-33 decisively crushed the resistance to the Kolchoz-feudal system and 
essentially eliminated the forces that stood up for the vexed national rights. Precisely this is 
what the totalitarian regime aimed for, what its representatives in Ukraine cynically discussed 
(Ibid 1995, p. 227; 2002, p. 282). 
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By hinting that the rest of the Ukrainian nation was as much attacked by the Soviet 
authorities as the peasants resisting collectivization, this extract clearly reinforces the 
nationalist image of the Soviet regime as a hostile, malicious force suppressing the 
Ukrainians.  
Given the severity of the disaster and the obvious involvement of the Soviet 
regime, one would expect the Famine period to be the prime candidate for nationalist 
myth-making of the type that sees ethnic others as the sole perpetrators and the ethnic 
„us‟ as the sole victims of the catastrophe. Yet, as in the account of the Bolsheviks seizure 
of power, the textbooks refrain from ethnic stereotyping. Thus the state and party 
officials involved in the collectivisation and food confiscation programmes are not 
pigeonholed as Russians or Jews. On the other hand, the downside of not addressing 
ethnic differences is that ethnic Ukrainians are not presented in an unfavourable light 
either. Thus the participation of many ethnic Ukrainians in the grain-requisition bands 
pillaging the countryside (Wilson 2002) is an embarrassing detail not mentioned by any 
of the textbooks. Therefore the textbook narratives do leave the overall impression that 
ethnic Ukrainians were only victims of and not collaborators in the food confiscation 
campaigns. 
 
Portrayals of the ethnic other in ‘positive’ periods 
 
Let us now turn to periods of foreign rule that are characterized by peace, economic 
growth, rising standards of living and expanding liberties, in other words the „positive‟ 
periods. The first of these episodes is the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881). In the 
aftermath of the lost Crimean War this „enlightened‟ tsar initiated major reforms, 
including the abolition of serfdom, an overhaul of the justice system, a tempering of 
censorship, autonomy for the universities, elected assemblies at the local and provincial 
levels, and universal military conscription. Following the Polish uprising in the early 
1860s, however, he also curtailed the cultural liberties of national minorities and pursued 
a policy of Russification. How do the textbooks appreciate this mixed legacy of 
expanding civic liberties, political reform and economic growth, on the one hand, and 
repression of Ukrainian cultural activities on the other?  
 As it turns out, the textbooks (Sarbei 1995; Turchenko and Moroko 2004) do 
appreciate the reforms but they immediately qualify them by saying that they were 
largely ineffective or served other interests than those of the Ukrainians themselves. Both 
books for instance acknowledge that the abolition of serfdom constituted a major step 
forward, freeing serfs from their landlords, offering them freedom of movement and 
allowing them to buy land and goods and engage in commercial activities. Yet, both 
authors are quick to point out that the reform was designed from above by the 
landowning nobility and therefore primarily served the interests of the landowners. They 
also observe that the reform did not improve the living conditions of the vast majority of 
peasants, crippled as these rural masses were by rents and feudal labour duties that the 
reform had not eliminated.  
 More fundamentally, the reforms are judged as being solely inspired by a desire to 
strengthen the Russian state and to catch up with western powers in socio-economic 
development. The Russian government thus never truly intended to grant more liberties 
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to the population and to the non-Russian nationalities, it is argued. Turchenko and 
Moroko (2004) for instance explain that the emancipation of the serfs created the supply 
of labour necessary for the development of industry in Ukraine. This industrialization, 
however, is described as one-sided, producing only raw materials and semi-manufactured 
goods as input for Russian industries, and is presented as the centre‟s major tool of 
economic colonization and exploitation. Understandably, both textbooks also deplore the 
tsarist decrees banning the use of Ukrainian in schools and in the printed media, seeing 
them as prime examples of the policy of domination and oppression by the Russian state. 
Turchenko and Moloko (2004, p. 153) are particularly outspoken on the intentions of the 
Russian state under Alexander II: “As before, Russian domestic politics rested on three 
fundamental principles: unification, bureaucratization and Russification”. 
 As it turns out, bad intentions are not just attributed to the Russian state. Sarbei 
(1995) for instance is overtly depreciatory of the Russians, Poles, Jews and other non-
Ukrainians. Discussing the plight of the Ukrainians in the second half of the nineteenth 
century he observes that “The majority of the landed nobility, and most of all those of 
Russian or Polish descent, displayed a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national 
idea. (…) The trade sector fell almost completely in the hands of Russians, Jews, 
Armenians and Greeks, who often did not operate as civilized merchants but as barbaric-
predatory wholesale buyers and sellers” (Ibid, pp. 105, 108). The succeeding textbook by 
Turchenko and Moroko (2004), by contrast, refrains from depicting inter-ethnic relations 
in stereotypical terms. Comparing the social position of Ukrainians to those of other 
nationalities, it provides a neutral description of the economic activities and settlement 
patterns of Russians and Jews and avoids negative qualifications. As with the narrative on 
the elimination of the Cossack Hetmanate, this could be indicative of a trend in textbook 
writing aiming to produce more de-nationalized historiographies. 
 I have identified the Soviet 1920s as the second positive period in Ukraine‟s 
history as this episode is generally appreciated as a time of relatively liberal conditions in 
both socio-economic and cultural domains. Lenin‟s pragmatic New Economic Policy 
(NEP) left the countryside in peace, which enabled peasants to freely manage the lands 
allocated to them by the Bolshevik land reforms. In the cultural sphere, the Ukrainians 
benefited from the Bolshevik campaign to combat illiteracy and invigorate the languages 
and cultures of the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union (the so-called 
Korenizatsia policy, which in Ukraine came to be known as Ukrainizatsia).  
 It appears that the textbooks are ambivalent about this episode. They present a 
cautious and qualified positive appraisal of the NEP. Turchenko (1995, 2002) and 
Kyl‟chyts‟kyi and Shapoval (2003) for instance both note that the conditions for the 
peasantry improved markedly after the authorities exchanged the rationing policy of the 
civil war period for taxation in kind. They further observe that the land redistribution 
scheme greatly benefited the poorest sections of the peasantry and that agricultural output 
rose sharply and had caught up with pre-revolution levels by 1927. The textbooks are 
even unreservedly positive about the government campaign to stimulate agricultural 
cooperatives, saying that the peasantry eagerly made use of these incentives to found 
cooperatives for the processing and sale of their products. Yet, it is argued that the 
Communist Party from the very onset had a much more comprehensive kind of 
cooperative in mind, and never abandoned the idea of a complete collectivization of 
agricultural land. Turchenko (1995, p. 189; 2002, p. 236) contends that this constituted a 
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major threat which hung like the “sword of Damocles” over the peasantry. More 
fundamentally, he deplores that the freedom in the economic sphere was not matched by 
political rights, leaving the peasantry powerless and exposed to the arbitrariness and 
ambitious industrialization plans of the communist apparatchiks.  
An equally hesitant account is given of the party-endorsed Ukrainianization 
campaign in the 1920s. One the one hand, this language policy is appreciated, as it 
“attracted many representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the process of cultural 
rebuilding, who sincerely attempted to serve the nation and to contribute to its social-
economic and spiritual revival” (Turchenko 1995, p. 194; Turchenko 2002, p. 240). In a 
similar manner, the books value the achievements such as the reduction of illiteracy, the 
mass admission of Ukrainians into the student population and the expansion of 
Ukrainian-language education, publications and official documents. On the other hand, 
they argue that Ukrainianisation was not strong enough to have a lasting impact on the 
language regime in the most important sphere of public life, the Communist Party 
bureaucracy, where Russian remained the dominant language. Turchenko notes that many 
party officials, particularly Russian or Russian-speaking ones, were negatively disposed 
towards Ukrainianization, “sabotaging it in all possible ways” (Ibid. 1995, p. 194, 2002, 
p. 241). Moreover, the books accuse the Bolshevik regime of seeing Ukrainianisation 
only as a tool to indoctrinate the population with the communist ideology rather than as a 
goal in itself. Kul‟chytskyi and Shapoval (2003, p. 200) for instance note: 
 
The cultural activities of the state were mainly directed at the education of the masses in 
the spirit of communism. The party controlled the content of the national-cultural process 
and demanded that cultural life was national in form and socialist in content, so that it did 
not contradict the communist doctrine.  
 
In sum, the books argue that the economic and cultural liberties of the 1920s were always 
subordinate to industrialization and the consolidation of the state and the party. As soon 
as the former began to be seen as conflicting with these objectives, they were abandoned.  
The third „positive‟ period of foreign rule investigated here is Khrushchev‟s Thaw 
(1956-1965). This period is widely recognized as a welcome and promising change to the 
suffocating totalitarianism of the Stalinist era. It stands out for its increased openness, 
economic decentralization, diversification of industry, rising standards of living, 
flowering of national cultures, and rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist persecution. 
The man who set this in motion, Nikita Khrushchev, is generally depicted as a rather rude 
and unsophisticated man with nonetheless good intentions. An authoritative source like 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB) for instance describes him as “a patriot who 
genuinely wanted to improve the lot of all Soviet citizens” (Ibid, 1994, p. 994). The EB 
also notes that Khrushchev was a Russian who had grown up in Ukraine and that this 
facilitated the careers of many Ukrainians in Moscow. Khrushchev‟s „Thaw‟ however is 
also remembered for its continuing Russification, failed agricultural experiments and rash 
diplomacy. 
The textbook narratives of the Khrushchev era are very much in line with those of 
the other two „positive‟ periods of foreign rule in Ukrainian history. On the one hand 
there is genuine appreciation for the reforms. Turchenko et al (1995, 2004) for instance 
note that the economic decentralization was conducive for the modernization of industry 
and the development of light industries, and that standards of living and the construction 
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of new homes rose sharply in the second half of the 1950s. Similarly, they value the 
relative freedom of expression which is said to have enabled a resurrection of Ukrainian 
literature and arts. On the other hand, it is argued that the Soviet authorities were not 
recognizing the intrinsic value of the reforms, perceiving them instead as instruments for 
the attainment of other objectives. As Turchenko et al (1995, p. 56; 2004, p.124) phrase 
it: 
 
The party leadership realized that without a certain measure of democratization it would 
not be possible to modernize the country, accelerate its economic development and 
maintain its status as a military superpower. 
 
Moreover, Turchenko et al are never tired of reminding the reader that the freedom of 
expression was still very much restricted and that people who dared to cross the line were 
relentlessly persecuted. Moreover, they deplore Khrushchev‟s conviction that all Soviet 
nationalities would spontaneously assimilate into a Russian-speaking Soviet nation 
(sblizhenia i sliania natsii), claiming that it ushered in a renewed Russification campaign 
that further weakened the position of Ukrainian in education, the media and other public 
domains. 
 As in the narratives of the other periods, the textbooks refrain from highlighting 
the ethnic background of the people and characters discussed. This has the distinct 
advantage that ethnic others are not judged negatively. Yet, it also excludes positive 
appraisals. It could be argued that the Kruschchev era – par excellence - has all the 
ingredients for more positive evaluations of ethnic others given Krushchev‟s own origin 
as a Russian Ukrainian, the careers of Ukrainians in central institutions and the socio-
economic progress in Ukraine itself. The fact that the textbooks fail to portray Russians 
or other Soviet nationalities in a more favourable light could reflect the allergy Ukrainian 
historians have to the Soviet slogan of „the brotherhood of all Soviet nationalities‟, but it 
could also be indicative of a nationalist motivated unwillingness to acknowledge the 
positive contributions ethnic others made to Ukraine‟s development.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
This article has examined how Ukrainian history textbooks portray the ethnic other, both 
as foreign ruler and as non-native national group. The most conspicuous feature of the 
textbooks is the unanimous condemnation of the foreign ruler – Russia in the years prior 
to the October Revolution and the Soviet Union in the years thereafter. The tsarist 
authorities and the Soviet regime are attributed malicious intentions, irrespective of their 
policies and the consequences for Ukraine. Never are the rulers in St Petersburg or 
Moscow perceived as being genuinely committed to the improvement of the living 
conditions and civic rights of Ukrainians. Always are they shown as being motivated by a 
determination to strengthen their hold on power and to consolidate the state vis-à-vis 
other powerful states in the international arena. The textbooks do not deny that there have 
been periods of relatively liberal rule when Ukraine benefited from economic and cultural 
reforms initiated by the centre, but they contend that the Russian and Soviet authorities 
had an instrumental attitude towards these reforms, never seeing prosperity and 
democratization as ends in themselves. As soon as liberal reforms were seen as 
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conflicting with the consolidation of power and the unity of the state, the centre would 
abandon them, the books argue. It needs to be reminded that Tsarist Russia and the Soviet 
Union were, of course, not democratic regimes, which lends some credence to the 
argument that they were mostly driven by power considerations. Yet, it would seem too 
harsh a judgement to assign only bad intentions to these foreign rulers, particularly in the 
face of evidence from other sources which credit some Soviet leaders with positive moral 
qualities. The exceptionally critical accounts of foreign rulers are therefore likely to 
reflect a desire to find a solid justification for Ukrainian statehood and to foster strong 
feelings of patriotism among youngsters. They send the political message that prosperity 
and freedom for the Ukrainian people can only be guaranteed by an independent 
Ukrainian state (Shapoval 1999). In this sense the textbook narratives on foreign regimes 
have a distinct nationalist bias. 
  The same cannot be said about appraisals of the ethnic other as a national group. 
The majority of the textbooks analysed in this study refrained from putting ethnic labels 
on individuals or groups. The few instances where this does happen and where negative 
judgements fall onto Russians and Jews are counterbalanced by excerpts criticizing 
ethnic Ukrainians or highlighting conflicting interests within the Ukrainian ethnic group. 
Only the failure of the books to present Russians, Jews or other non-Ukrainian groups in 
a positive light may be seen as an omission constituting a small ethnic bias. Nonetheless, 
the absence of any positive evaluations of ethnic others in combination with the harsh 
judgement of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union may well produce or maintain strong 
feelings of alienation among Russians and other minorities. These groups could well 
interpret the textbook rhetoric as a verdict condemning them for their „collaboration‟ with 
the foreign regime in the „suppression‟ of Ukrainians, and as a message telling them they 
are not welcome in Ukraine.  
 There is no reason, however, to end this paper with gloomy conjectures.  
The analysis has also shown that the newest generation of textbooks present more 
balanced accounts of inter-ethnic relations than the first series of textbooks. Moreover, 
although the rule of former president Kuchma will not be remembered for its 
commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Ukraine‟s educational 
authorities have increasingly sought to involve international agencies in the preparation 
of educational reforms in this period. From 1996, for instance, the Ministry of Education 
and the Council of Europe (COE) have jointly organized a series of seminars and 
conferences in Ukraine on reforming the teaching of history and the COE‟s Education for 
Democratic Citizenship program. Remarkably, the participants of these seminars (civic 
servants, teachers and textbook writers) were not afraid to be highly critical of the state of 
history education in Ukraine, urging textbook authors to write books that present multi-
perspective views including those of minorities and encourage student creativity and 
critical thinking. One civic servant, for instance, denounced the current textbooks for 
ascribing intentions to historical leaders that they could not have possessed (Council of 
Europe 1999; 2000).  The policy recommendations resulting from these conferences did 
not fall on deaf ears as the Ministry of Education incorporated them in the central 
requirements (the so-called State Standards) for the curriculum of the new 12 year school 
system. The new standard for the theme „Knowledge of Society‟ (suspil’stvoznavstvo), 
which includes History of Ukraine, for instance, mentions the cultivation of tolerance and 
respect for other nations, critical thinking, responsibility, independent judgement, and the 
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ability to make a conscious choice as key objectives of the new curriculum (Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine, 2004, p. 3).  
It is by no means certain, however, that the scholars on whom the Ministry 
depends for the writing of curricula and textbooks are equally supportive of a major 
reform of history education. Typically these scholars belong to the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia and consider it their lifework to expose the Tsarist and Soviet „crimes‟ 
against the Ukrainian nation.
4
 Obviously, the single anti-Soviet narrative they have in 
mind conflicts with efforts to promote a multiplicity of perspectives. There are already 
signs that the language of reform of the state standards is not filtering down in curricula 
and textbooks. For instance, the new history curriculum for the fifth grade as before 
presents a strictly chronological narrative of Ukrainian history and specifies in detail the 
content, the volume and the timing of the subject matter.
5
 Plans to institute an integrated 
history course combining world and national history are viewed with equal suspicion by 
these scholars as they are seen as covert measures to reduce the number of hours and thus 
to economize on history education (Kul‟chyts‟kyi, 2000). 
 Yet, it is not only the civil servants at the Ministry who are pressing for changes. 
There are movements at the grassroots level which suggest that there is broad support for 
reform. A survey among history and civics teachers conducted in September-October 
2001 for instance found that making myths of past events and outdated approaches to the 
selection of facts and their interpretation were mentioned as key problems in the current 
history courses (Verbytska 2004). Moreover, the all-Ukrainian Association of History 
Teachers Nova Doba has taken the initiative to develop an auxiliary textbook on 
Ukrainian history for the tenth grade in cooperation with the international umbrella 
organization of history teachers Euroclio and several foreign experts. This book 
(Komarov et al 2004) closely resembles western textbooks in approach and teaching 
methods.  
All these developments indicate that history education has become the object of a 
heated public debate in which interests clash and nation-building increasingly has to 
compete with other pedagogical objectives.  This, it might be argued, is only one of the 
many indicators that democracy is growing to maturity in Ukraine, a process so vividly 
illustrated by the peaceful civic revolution in December 2004 and the orderly 
parliamentary elections of March 2006. Under these conditions, it seems only a matter of 
time before the lively public debate penetrates the schools and influences the history 
lessons. If this happens, history will indeed repeat itself, and the aforementioned 
evolutionary model by Kuzio will have rightly predicted the developments in history 
education.  
  
  
 
 
                                                 
4
 For an example of this attitude, see the open letter of February 2005 which criticises a campaign led by 
communist deputies to rehabilitate the Soviet regime, particularly regarding its role in World War II. This 
letter, which was addressed to the president and parliament, was signed by a number of well-known 
historians (Hurzhi, 2005). 
5
 For the new curriculum, see Navchal’na Programa dlia Zahal’noosvitnikh Navchal’nykh Zakladiv (12 
Richna Shkola), Istoria Ukraina, 5 Klas (2005) (teaching programme for 12 year comprehensive schools, 
5
th
 class). 
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